working conditions were evidence of discrimination against the inbred faculty rather than evidence of its relatively lower level of scholarly performance, as had been claimed by earlier investigators. Both McGee and the earlier investigators relied on an examination of the zero-order associations between academic nativity and scholarly performance, and academic nativity and various measures of university rewards (such as rank, salary, etc.), in order to determine the nature of the latter set of variables. Both McGee and the earlier investigators found that inbred faculty members tended to have lower ranks, longer periods before promotion, etc. But whereas earlier investigators found that inbred faculty members had lower levels of scholarly performance, and then concluded that their lesser university rewards were additional evidence of these lower levels of performance, McGee found that at Texas the inbred faculty had higher levels of scholarly performance, and then concluded that their lesser rewards were evidence of the existence of discrimination.
Shortly after the publication of McGee's research, Lieberson and Gold (1961) pointed out that examination of such zero-order associations is not sufficient for determining the existence of discrimination, and that this question requires multivariate analysis to determine whether academic nativity is associated with university rewards after the effects of scholarly productivity are controlled. This objection, which is equally applicable to the researches that preceeded McGee's work, was not met in McGee's response ( In general, Berelson's discussion of inbreeding at the top of the U.S. academic hierarchy is notable for its lack of any evidence about the scholarly productivity of noninbred, inbred, and silver-corded faculty members. Indeed, Berelson does not explicitly speculate about the question of the relative productivity of scholars at the most eminent universities. On the one hand, inbred scholars may be more productive than their noninbred colleagues, and this circumstance would suggest that inbred scientists at eminent universities constitute an elite group of highly productive individuals who have been recruited by their doctoral departments in an effort to maintain departmental eminence. On the other hand, inbred scholars may be less productive. This does not, however, imply that the inbred scholars owe their positions to the operation of particularistic standards in the hiring of faculty. For example, even if inbred scholars at eminent universities are less productive than their colleagues, they may still be more productive than scholars at less eminent universities. In attempting to maintain their positions of eminence, distinguished departments may be forced to hire their own graduates because, though not as able and productive as the other members on the faculties, they are the next most productive scholars available. As long as inbred faculty at the most eminent universities are more productive than those less eminent universities, Berelson's claim that traditional negative evaluations of academic inbreeding are inappropriate for the most eminent U.S. universities is justifiable.
While their data are less adequate than the data presented by those who earlier viewed academic inbreeding as an indication of institutional particularism, the hypotheses and speculations of McGee and Berelson are not necessarily inconsistent with the results of those earlier investigators. The earlier investigators did not take into account institutional prestige, while Berelson and McGee argued for the benefits of academic inbreeding in terms of specific prestige strata. For example, although inbred scholars may be generally less productive than noninbred scholars, it is conceivable that the opposite relationship might exist among scholars in the top prestige universities. Similarly, the finding that inbred faculty are discriminated against in terms of such rewards as salary and promotion may not occur in universities with more or less prestige than the department studied by McGee.
In this paper, we present a more extensive examination of the possible concomitants and consequences of academic inbreeding. We attempt to determine whether the explanations of inbreeding suggested by McGee and Berelson are consistent with data from a large sample of scientists in U.S. universities. We employ measures of a scientist's scholarly productivity and the eminence of a scientist's current department in multivariate analyses of the concomitants of holding a faculty position at one's doctoral university. In addition, since our samples of scientists include scholars from nearly every graduate institution in the United States, we are able to obtain an indication of whether conclusions presented in previous studies of single universities, such as McGee's study of the University of Texas, are generalizable to other similar universities.
THE DATA
The study reported here is based upon information about U.S. academic scientists originally collected by Warren 0. Hagstrom in 1966.2 Hagstrom drew systematic random samples of U.S. graduate faculty members in the fields of mathematics, experimental biology, physics, and chemistry. Data from such sources as American Men of Science were collected so that education and occupational histories could be constructed for the members of these samples. In addition, since scholars in these fields publish their research almost exclusively in the form of journal articles, information about the number of articles published by each of the members of these samples, and also about citations to their previous research work, was collected from the 1966 edition of Science Citation Index. Complete information on these topics was obtained for 1,514 scientists.
Because the sample sizes for each of the four fields are inadequate to support the kinds of multivariate analyses reported below, we have combined data from all four in our study. Our preliminary examination of the zero-order relationships between the variables discussed below within each of the four fields revealed few appreciable differences from field to field, and it is unlikely that statistically reliable interaction effects would be revealed by more intensive analysis within each of the fields. In combining data for such variables as the number of articles a scientist has published and the number of citations to a scientist's work, we have eliminated disciplinary differences in means and standard deviations by computing field-specific standard scores rather than simply analyzing raw score values. Other variables, such as prestige ratings for individual graduate departments, have not been standardized in this manner, since they were created in such a way as to yield fairly comparable distributions from field to field (Cartter 1966 , pp. 15-16).
We present results separately for scholars currently (at the time of the survey) holding their first academic position and for those holding their 2 A description of Hagstrom's sampling procedures and resulting sample will be found in Hagstrom (1967, pp. 98-109) . We wish to thank Professor Hagstrom for his kindness in furnishing us with these data. Hagstrom's research was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (GS-1725). Given these considerations and restrictions, the distribution of sample cases upon which the following analysis is based is as presented in 
RESULTS
In the following analysis we examine two questions. First, we examine the relationships between academic inbreeding and measures of scholarly performance after controlling for other variables such as the prestige of a scientist's present departmental affiliation. Second, we examine the independent relationship between academic inbreeding and a measure of institutional reward, the number of years which elapsed between a scientist's appointment to his first position and his first subsequent promotion. This latter analysis obviously can only be carried out for the subgroup of our sample who have had more than one position during their careers and who were promoted at the university where they received their first position.
Inbreeding and Scholarly Performance
We turn first to the relationship between inbreeding and scientific productivity among scientists currently at their first academic positions. Table 2 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses carried out for this 4 The prestige scores here are those reported by Cartter for the "rated quality of graduate faculty" (Cartter 1966 , p. 12). Since Cartter does not present prestige scores for departments below the "strong" level, we used the midpoints of the intervals corresponding to each of the lower levels to represent the prestige of departments in those levels (Cartter 1966 , p. 16). Departments not included in Cartter's survey were assigned a prestige score of 1.0 because we found their members to be less productive in terms of publications and citations received than members of departments which obtained ratings of "adequate" to "insufficient" in Cartter's survey, and which were assigned a score of 1.5 in accordance with the midpoint convention described above. Hagstrom (1971, pp. 379-80) has shown that measures of the publications and citations received by the members of a department have high loadings on a departmental prestige factor obtained from a factor analysis of departmental characteristics. subgroup, and since the form of presentation employed in this table will be repeated through the rest of this paper, it is appropriate to comment upon its general design and purpose. Table 2 presents the results of two separate regression analyses, one in which the number of articles published by a scientist is the dependent variable, and the other in which the number of citations made to a scientist's previously published work is the dependent variable. These two indicators are commonly used to measure the quantity and the quality of a scientist's research output, and, as mentioned above, we have converted the raw scores for these indicators into field-specific standard scores before combining scientists in the various disciplines in our analysis. We have regressed both of these dependent variables on three independent variables: the prestige of a scientist's current department, the year in which the scientist received his Ph.D., and the scientist's inbreeding status or "academic nativity." It is well known that the quantity and quality of scientists' publications vary positively with the prestige of their departments (Zuckerman 1970, pp. 245-47) and that scientists just launching their careers after having obtained their first position are less productive and therefore less frequently cited than their slightly more experienced colleagues who have established research programs. These two variables are therefore included in the analysis so that a more accurate estimation of the independent relation between inbreeding and the quantity and quality of a scientist's publications can be obtained. The third independent variable, academic nativity, is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one when a scientist holds a position in the department where he took his Ph.D., and a value of zero when this is not the case.
Both the unstandardized (b) and the standardized (b*) regression co- statistically significant relationships with the two dependent variables. These relationships are also in the directions predicted above. On the other hand, although academic nativity shows negative independent relations with the two dependent variables, the coefficients for these relations are not large enough to bring about the rejection of the null hypothesis that there is actually no relationship between academic nativity and the quantity and quality of a scientist's publications. Thus, we conclude there is no evidence here to suggest that academic inbreeding has any particular independent relationship with scientific productivity when departmental prestige and year of Ph.D. are included in the analysis.
The results presented in table 2 are all scientists in our sample currently at their first positions, and the inclusion of departmental prestige as a continuous variable in our regressions precludes the discovery of differences in the relationships of academic inbreeding and quantity and quality of publications within different prestige levels conceived as discrete strata. Since Berelson has suggested that among the most prestigious universities inbred scholars may be more productive than their colleagues, we have disaggregated the sample into prestige strata by grouping departments included in a single descriptive rating category used by Cartter (1966, pp. 12-16). For example, Cartter labeled those departments with average ratings of 4.0 and above as being of "distinguished" quality, and in fact his raters used a five-point rating scale in which this adjective corresponded to the highest possible rating. Because we are interested in the possibility that inbreeding has a different relationship to scholarly output among the most prestigious departments, we have therefore rerun our regressions on only those scientists who have positions in departments labeled as distinguished by Cartter. The results of these regressions are presented in table 3. Although the regression coefficients for academic inbreeding are once again both negative, and although they are of larger magnitudes than their counterparts in table 2, the number of cases upon which table 3 is based is so small that the inbreeding coefficients once again fail to be statistically significant. Although we do not present the results here, we have also rerun the above regressions for the other prestige strata distinguished by Cartter and have found results quite similar to those in table 3. There is no evidence that the relationship between academic inbreeding and scholarly output varies across departmental prestige strata, and the results presented in table 2 appear to represent relationships which exist within general prestige strata as well as across them. In addition, neither the idea that inbred scientists are less able and productive than their colleagues, nor the idea that they are more able and productive, finds much support in tables 2 and 3.
Thus doctoral departments after spending part of their careers elsewhere tend to be less productive (in terms of quantity and quality of publications) than those who are not inbred. However, being inbred or silvercorded accounts for only a small proportion of the variance in either dependent variable (as represented by the standardized regression coefficients), and one of the coefficients for the "silver-corded" category is too small to merit rejection of the hypothesis that it differs from zero because of sampling error. In general, the results in the upper panel of table 4 furnish support for the hypothesis that holding a position in one's doctoral department is negatively associated with scholarly output, and, like the results in tables 2 and 3, no support for the contrary hypothesis of a positive association between these variables. As was the case in previous tables, the prestige of one's current department has positive independent relations with the measures of scholarly output, and the year of one's Ph.D. degree has negative independent relations with these measures.
A comparison of the relative magnitudes of the unstandardized regression coefficients for these two independent variables and their corresponding coefficients in table 2 indicates that whereas prestige of current department has larger coefficients in table 4 than in table 2, year of Ph.D. exhibits the opposite pattern. These results are in accord with expectations that there is a smaller correlation between scientific productivity and prestige of department among young scientists than among older scientists (Hargens and Hagstrom 1967, pp. 34-35), and that the negative relationship between length of career and scholarly performance is greater among young scientists just beginning their careers than among older scientists.6
In the lower panel of table 4 we turn once again to the question of whether scientists at the most prestigious graduate departments show different relationships between academic nativity and measures of scholarly output than the more general population of scientists in all graduate departments. The results presented are consistent with those in previous tables: once again the regression coefficients for the categories of academic na-6 Any curvilinearity in the relationship between age and scientific productivity appears to be due to relatively lower productivity rates for scientists just starting their careers and for scientists at and beyond the age of retirement (Dennis 1956 (Dennis , 1966 tivity have negative signs. Although the unstandardized coefficients for these categories are somewhat larger than those presented in previous tables (the standardized coefficients are of similar magnitude to those in previous tables), the small sample size precludes the rejection of the hypothesis that these coefficients differ from zero only because of sampling error. Our replication of this analysis within the other prestige strata distinguished by Cartter yielded results similar to those in table 5, and we therefore conclude that the results shown in table 4 for all graduate universities appear to represent adequately the results within the various prestige strata.
The results in each of the four tables presented thus far indicate that when we control for professional experience, scientists with positions at their doctoral departments tend to be slightly less productive, in terms of quantity and quality of publications, than their noninbred colleagues. Although these differences are fairly small and most often statistically insignificant, it is notable that every one of the 12 regression coefficients indicating a comparison of inbred with noninbred scientists shows a negative sign. On the basis of this evidence it is not unreasonable to suggest that a slight negative relationship between inbreeding and professional output does exist, but that the relationship, independent of other variables, is so small that in a given instance only very large samples enable us to reject the null hypothesis that its manifestation in that instance is attributable to sampling error.
These results certainly allow us to reject the argument that inbred scholars, relative to their noninbred colleagues, are highly productive individuals whose services could not ordinarily be obtained by their doctoral departments except for the affective ties to region, community, and/or alma mater which can be invoked by these departments. On the basis of the evidence presented above, this argument can be rejected as a description of inbred scholars generally, and of particular groups of inbred scholars (silver-corded scholars, inbred scholars at high-prestige departments) who are often cited as being unexpectedly able and productive given their institutional locations. On the other hand, the evidence presented above fails to speak directly to the question of whether inbred scholars in a given prestige stratum of departments are more productive than noninbred scholars in the next lower prestige stratum. Although inbred scholars appear to be slightly less productive than their noninbred colleagues, this does not mean that they may not simultaneously be much more productive than other scholars in a lower prestige stratum. In order to assess the likelihood of this latter possibility, it is necessary to have recourse to information about the productivity levels of the specific groups involved in such a comparison.
Since it is impossible to obtain reliable productivity estimates for de-tailed breakdowns of our sample by prestige of department, professional experience, and academic nativity, we will rely upon the results of the multiple regression analyses presented in table 2 and 4 to provide us with estimates of the productivity levels of the groups in question. Although the regression coefficients for the categories of academic nativity were usually statistically insignificant, in view of the consistently negative signs shown for these coefficients we will treat them as estimates of the true independent associations between the categories of academic nativity and our measures of scholarly output (thus attributing their lack of statistical significance to inadequate sample sizes). By arbitrarily assuming a certain Ph.D. year and contrasting inbred scholars at departments in one prestige stratum with noninbred scholars at departments in the next lower stratum, we may obtain estimates of their respective productivity levels from the regression equations presented in tables 2 and 4. For example, an estimate of the number of articles published by silver-corded scholars at departments labeled by Cartter as "distinguished" can be obtained from the formula: . These results suggest that inbred scholars at "distinguished" departments and noninbred scholars at "strong" departments are indistinguishable, as far as professional productivity is concerned, when degree of professional experience is controlled. Although the latter group tends to show higher productivity levels than the former group, all comparisons are within 0.1 standard deviation. Differences of such small magnitudes are unlikely to be perceived by practicing scientists who lack information about their actual sizes. Given that there are no apparent dif- ferences between the productivity levels of the inbred and noninbred groups in table 6, it would appear that the speculation that inbred scholars constitute a highly able and productive group is very questionable, even when inbred scholars are compared with scholars in a lower prestige stratum. An obvious alternative hypothesis is that inbred scholars, who are no more productive than scholars in a lower prestige stratum, have obtained positions in a higher prestige stratum than they would ordinarily merit because of particularistic ties with their Ph.D. departments.
Inbreeding and Time Taken for Promotion
We turn now to an examination of the relationship between academic nativity and one form of institutional reward which a scholar may enjoy: rapid promotion. McGee argued (on the basis of insufficient evidence) that inbred scholars at the University of Texas were discriminated against in terms of promotion and other rewards, and that Texas was able to employ the resources freed in this manner for competition for scholars on the national labor market. Although we cannot evaluate the adequacy of both elements of McGee's argument, we can evaluate the adequacy of the first element by examining the association between academic nativity and the amount of time scholars spend before promotion in rank. In addition, since our sample covers all U.S. graduate institutions, we can assess the extent to which McGee's argument about the University of Texas is also applicable to other universities. In our analysis we attempt to meet criticisms of McGee's failure to carry out a multivariate analysis of the relationships among academic nativity, scholarly productivity, and time taken for promotion. However, since our productivity measures were gathered for the time that the survey was carried out rather than for the entire professional careers of the sample members, we can interpret these measures only as indicators of the actual productivity of scholars during earlier periods, before their promotions. The adequacy of this procedure is clearly dependent upon the correlations of the measures across time periods, and although there is fragmentary evidence that these correlations are fairly high over periods of five or ten years,8 the larger question of stability of scientists' relative productivity levels over the course of their careers remains an important unexamined question in the sociology of science. In the following analysis we use the number of citations to a scientist's previous work, rather than the number of articles published by a scientist, to measure scientists' productivity levels. The use of the former measure has two advantages over the use of the latter: first, "quality" of research productivity has been shown to be of greater consequence for institutional rewards than mere "quantity" (Cole and Cole 1967, pp. 384-88), and, second, citations to scientists' previously published research probably have larger correlations across given time periods than the number of articles published by scientists.
In order to eliminate differences in time taken for promotion which may be due to the particular kind of promotion involved (e.g., assistant professor to associate professor vs. associate professor to full professor), we have restricted our analysis to the promotion from assistant to associate professor. Although there is somewhat less variation in time taken for promotion to associate professor than in time taken for promotion to full professor, sample sizes are much larger for analyses of the former variable. In addition, the former variable is often thought to be more crucial in that it is almost always connected to the attainment of a tenured status. Since we are interested in the differential treatment of inbred and noninbred scholars by departments which have originally hired and then promoted these scholars, it is also necessary to restrict our analysis to the members of our sample who have been promoted at the department where they obtained their first position. These restrictions yield a subsample of those scientists who are presently at their second and succeeding positions and which is composed of 788 members. Table 6A presents results of the regression of years taken for promotion to associate professor on prestige of department, year of Ph.D., number of citations to work, and academic nativity for the entire subsample described above. Once again, in order to remove differences between fields in the means and standard deviations of time taken for promotion, we have calculated field-specific standard scores for this variable before combining cases from the different fields covered by our sample.
The results in table 6A indicate that, net of its associations with the Although the results presented in table 6 might appear to suggest that the phenomenon of discrimination against inbred scientists is more general than McGee perceived, two important caveats are in order. First, it is always dangerous to infer the existence of discrimination on the basis of a residual association between an independent variable like academic nativity and a dependent variable like time taken for promotion. This kind of residual association may be due to many factors, the most plausible of which are the failure to include all relevant independent variables in the analyses and systematic measurement error. For example, to the extent that inbred scientists fall below noninbred scientists on other factors relevant for promotion in rank besides those included in an analysis, the analysis may yield the appearance of discrimination even where none exists. Given that only one factor (citations to previous work) commonly thought to be relevant to promotion in rank is included in the above analysis, it is certainly possible that this kind of circumstance might be present. Thus, the results presented in table 6A can at most be interpreted as presumptive evidence for the existence of discrimination against inbred scientists.
Second, the existence of a relation between two variables in a general population does not necessarily imply the existence of that relation in each of the various subgroups of the population. The question of the generality of the relations shown in table 6A over various prestige strata has therefore not yet been determined. In table 6B we therefore present the results of analyses for each of four general prestige strata distinguished by Cartter.
It is evident that there is substantial variation in the independent association between academic nativity and time taken for promotion across prestige strata. Only among scientists in the lowest prestige category does this association attain statistical significance, and the unstandardized regression coefficients for this association tend to be smaller in successively higher prestige strata. Thus, unlike the results obtained in our analysis of the association of academic nativity with scholarly productivity, there does appear to be an interaction effect across prestige strata in the relation between academic nativity and time taken for promotion. What is more, the interaction effect appears to be quite consistent with McGee's argument about the relative prominence of discrimination against inbred scholars in low-prestige, as opposed to high-prestige, universities. McGee made his argument in terms of the University of Texas, a university he identified as facing financial and regional handicaps in competition in the national academic labor market. Although Texas may be handicapped in these respects as far as competition with the 10 or 12 most eminent U.S. universities is concerned, it certainly cannot be considered to face such handicaps relative to all U.S. universities. Thus, it is notable that Texas usually ranks in the "good" and "strong" categories for most disciplines in the American Council on Education prestige ratings, and that these strata show much smaller independent relationships between inbreeding and time taken for promotion than the relationship shown for the lowest prestige stratum.
In view of these circumstances, the findings of Lieberson and Gold which suggested no discrimination against inbred scholars at Texas are consistent with those presented above. But, although it would appear that McGee's argument about discrimination against inbred faculty members at Texas is highly questionable, his general argument about that kind of discrimination at universities which face the handicaps he attributes to Texas may be correct. These handicaps, especially the financial ones, are present in their most extreme form in the lowest prestige stratum of universities (Cartter 1966 , pp. 107-17), and it is in this stratum that the results in table 6B are consistent with McGee's argument about the existence of discrimination against inbred scholars. Once again, however, it is necessary to caution that the results in table 6B can only offer presumptive evidence for the existence of the hypothesized discrimination, and that this evidence has no bearing whatsoever on McGee's broader functional argument about the manner in which resources made available by the discrimination are utilized by the universities in which it takes place.
CONCLUSIONS
Although the results presented above certainly do not conclusively resolve the questions about academic inbreeding at U.S. universities, they tend to be generally more consistent with early interpretations which identified inbreeding as a manifestation of particularism and parochialism rather than with the more recent objections to these traditional interpretations. This is especially true with respect to Berelson's claim that inbreeding at the most eminent universities is a natural outcome of the dominance of these universities as producers of the most able scholars. Our evidence suggests that not only are inbred scholars at the most eminent universities less productive than their noninbred colleagues, but also they are no more pro-ductive than noninbred scholars in the next lower prestige stratum of universities. This kind of circumstance is entirely consistent with the traditional hypothesis that the chief difference between inbred scholars in high-prestige departments and scholars in departments of lesser eminence lies not in any difference in their levels of scholarly productivity, but instead in differences in their particularistic ties to the high-prestige departments. Our results also suggest that the relation between academic inbreeding and scholarly productivity found among the most eminent universities also holds throughout the prestige hierarchy of universities. Thus, the enhancement of career opportunities through particularistic ties with doctoral institutions appears to occur in lower prestige strata as well as the highest ones.
The results presented above are also consistent with McGee's hypothesis that inbred scholars are discriminated against in the allocation of institutional rewards at universities which face great financial and regional handicaps in competition in the national labor market for scholars. Although it is doubtful that the University of Texas can be adequately described as this kind of institution, universities in the lowest prestige stratum can, and it is among these latter universities that we find evidence consistent with McGee's hypothesis. It should be noted that since we have no information about the scholarly productivity levels of scientists outside U.S. graduate universities, we cannot determine whether this possible discrimination against inbred scientists exists simultaneously with discrimination for inbred scholars in terms of particularistic hiring practices. It may be, for example, that these scientists are less productive than many scientists at colleges and in industry who would choose a job in a graduate department if given the opportunity. Thus, discrimination in hiring in favor of a department's former students is not necessarily inconsistent with the discrimination against these students in the allocation of institutional rewards such as promotion in rank.
Finally, we conclude by emphasizing two points. First, our examination of the relationships among academic inbreeding, scholarly performance, and career progress obviously does not provide information about the specific mechanisms and effects of the particularistic ties which academic inbreeding may reflect. Although the results presented above are inconsistent with the claim that inbred scholars are more talented and productive than their noninbred peers, they do not imply any particular causal ordering between academic nativity and scholarly productivity. It may be, for example, that inbred scholars lack the degree of exposure to new ideas and techniques which makes for a higher level of scientific productivity and creativity (Pelz and Andrews 1966, pp. 140-53), or that their old ties to their professors inhibit the development of a sense of independence and personal innovation. Such arguments are entirely consistent with the results pre-
